Generalized property-directed reachability (GPDR) belongs to the family of the model-checking techniques called IC3/PDR. It has been successfully applied to software verification; for example, it is the core of Spacer, a state-of-the-art Horn-clause solver bundled with Z3. However, it has yet to be applied to hybrid systems, which involve a continuous evolution of values over time. As the first step towards GPDRbased model checking for hybrid systems, this paper formalizes HGPDR, an adaptation of GPDR to hybrid systems, and proves its soundness. We also implemented a semi-automated proof-of-concept verifier, which allows a user to provide hints to guide verification steps.
Introduction
A hybrid system is a dynamical system that exhibits both continuous-time dynamics (called a flow ) and discrete-time dynamics (called a jump). This combination of flows and jumps is an essential feature of cyber-physical systems (CPS), a physical system governed by software. In the modern world where safety-critical CPS are prevalent, their correctness is an important issue.
Model checking [14, 19] is an approach to guaranteeing hybrid system safety. It tries to prove that a given hybrid system does not violate a specification by abstracting its behavior and by exhaustively checking that the abstracted model conforms to the specification.
In the area of software model checking, an algorithm called property-directed reachability (PDR), also known as IC3, is attracting interest [5, 7, 13] . IC3/PDR was initially proposed in the area of hardware verification; it was then transferred to software model checking by Cimatti et al. [11] . Its effectiveness for software model checking is now widely appreciated. For example, the SMT solver Z3 [28] comes with a Horn-clause solver Spacer [21] that uses PDR internally; Horn-clause solving is one of the cutting-edge techniques to verify functional programs [6, 9, 17] and programs with loops [6] .
We propose a model checking method for hybrid automata [3] based on the idea of PDR; the application of PDR to hybrid automata is less investigated compared to its application to software systems. Concretely, we propose an adaptation of a variant of PDR called generalized property-directed reachability (GPDR)
proposed by Hoder and Bjørner [20] . Unlike the original PDR, which is specialized to jump-only automata-based systems, GPDR is parametrized over a map over predicates on states (i.e., a forward predicate transformer ); the detail of the underlying dynamic semantics of a verified system is encapsulated into the forward predicate transformer. This generality of GDPR enables the application of PDR to systems outside the scope of the original PDR by itself; for example, Hoder et al. [20] show how to apply GPDR to programs with recursive function calls.
An obvious challenge in an adaptation of GPDR to hybrid automata is how to deal with flow dynamics that do not exist in software systems. To this end, we extend the logic on which the forward predicate transformer is defined so that it can express flow dynamics specified by an ordinary differential equation (ODE). Our extension, inspired by the differential dynamic logic (dL) proposed by Platzer [31] , is to introduce continuous reachability predicates (CRP) of the form D | ϕ I ϕ where D is an ODE and ϕ I and ϕ are predicates. This CRP is defined to hold under valuation σ if there is a continuous transition from σ to certain valuation σ ′ that satisfies the following conditions: (1) the continuous transition is a solution of D, (2) the valuation σ ′ makes ϕ true, and (3) ϕ I is true at every point on the continuous transition. With this extended logic, we define a forward predicate transformer that faithfully encodes the behavior of a hybrid automaton. We find that we can naturally extend GPDR to hybrid automata by our predicate transformer.
We formalize our adaptation of GPDR to hybrid automata, which we call HGPDR. In the formalization, we define a forward predicate transformer that precisely expresses the behavior of hybrid automata [3] using dL. We prove the soundness of HGPDR. We also describe our proof-of-concept implementation of HGPDR and show how it verifies a simple hybrid automaton with human intervention.
In order to make this paper self-contained, we detail GPDR for discrete-time systems before describing our adaptation to hybrid automata. After fixing the notations that we use in Section 2, we define a discrete-time transition system and hybrid automata in Section 3. Section 4 then reviews the GPDR procedure. Section 5 presents HGPDR, our adaptation of GPDR to hybrid automata, and states the soundness of the procedure. We describe a proof-of-concept implementation in Section 6. After discussing related work in Section 7, we conclude in Section 8.
For readability, several definitions and proofs are presented in the appendices.
Preliminary
We write R for the set of reals. We fix a finite set V := {x 1 , . . . , x N } of variables. We often use primed variables x ′ and x ′′ . The prime notation also applies to a set of variables; for example, we write V ′ for {x ′ 1 , . . . , x ′ N }. We use metavariable x for a finite sequence of variables. We write Fml for the set of quantifier-free first-order formulas over V ∪ V ′ ∪ V ′′ ; its elements are ranged over by ϕ. We call elements of the set Σ : =(V ∪ V ′ ∪ V ′′ ) → R a valuations; they are represented by metavariable σ. We use the prime notation for valuations. For example, if
We write σ[x → r] for the valuation obtained by updating the entry for x in σ with r. We write σ |= ϕ if σ is a model of ϕ; σ |= ϕ if σ |= ϕ does not hold; |= ϕ if σ |= ϕ for any σ; and |= ϕ if there exists σ such that σ |= ϕ. We sometimes identify a valuation σ with a logical formula x∈V x = σ(x).
State-transition systems and verification problem
We review the original GPDR for discrete-time systems [20] in Section 4 before presenting our adaptation for hybrid systems in Section 5. This section defines the models used in these explanations (Section 3.1 and 3.2) and formally states the verification problem that we tackle (Section 3.3).
Discrete-time state-transition systems (DTSTS)
We model a discrete-time program by a state-transition system. Definition 3.1. A discrete-time state-transition system (DTSTS) is a tuple Q, q 0 , ϕ 0 , δ . We use metavariable S D for DTSTS. Q = {q 0 , q 1 , q 2 , . . .} is a set of locations. q 0 is the initial location. ϕ 0 is the formula that has to be satisfied by the initial valuation.
q, ϕ, ϕ c , q ′ ∈ δ intuitively means that, if the system is at the location q with valuation σ 1 and σ 1 |= ϕ, then the system can make a transition to the location q ′ and change its valuation to σ ′ 2 such that σ 1 ∪ σ ′ 2 |= ϕ c . We call ϕ the guard of the transition. ϕ c is a predicate over V ∪ V ′ that defines the command of the transition; it defines how the value of the variables may change in this transition. The elements of V represent the values before the transition whereas those of V ′ represent the values after the transition. Figure 1 is an example of a DTSTS that models a program to compute the value of 1 + · · · + x; Q := {q 0 , q 1 } and ϕ 0 := x ≥ 0 ∧ sum = 0. In the transition from q 0 to q 0 , the guard is x > 0; the command is
In the transition from q 0 to q 1 , the guard is x ≤ 0; the command is x ′ = x ∧ sum ′ = sum because this transition does not change the value of x and sum. Therefore, the transition relation δ = 
Hybrid automaton (HA)
We model a hybrid system by a hybrid automaton (HA) [3] . We define an HA as an extension of DTSTS as follows.
Definition 3.3. A hybrid automaton (HA) is a tuple Q, q 0 , ϕ 0 , F, inv , δ . The components Q, q 0 , ϕ 0 , and δ are the same as Definition 3.1. We use metavariable S H for HA. F is a map from Q to ODE on V that specifies the flow dynamics at each location; inv is a map from Q to Fml that specifies the stay condition 3 at each state.
A state of a hybrid automaton is a tuple q, σ . A run of Q, q 0 , ϕ 0 , F, inv , δ is a sequence of states q 0 , σ 0 q 1 , σ 1 . . . q n , σ n where σ 0 |= ϕ 0 . The system is allowed to make a transition from q i , σ i to q i+1 , σ i+1 if (1) σ i reaches a valuation σ ′ along with the flow dynamics specified by F (q i ), (2) inv (q i ) holds at every point on the flow, and (3) q i , σ ′ can jump to q i+1 , σ i+1 under the transition relation δ. In order to define the set of runs formally, we need to define the continuous-time dynamics that happens within each location. Definition 3.4. Let D be an ordinary differential equation (ODE) on V and let x 1 (t), . . . , x n (t) be a solution of D where t is the time. Let us write σ (t) for the valuation {x 1 → x 1 (t), . . . , x n → x n (t)}. We write σ → D,ϕ σ ′ if (1) σ = σ (0) and (2) there exists t ′ ≥ t such that σ ′ = σ (t ′ ) and σ (t ′′ ) |= ϕ for any t ′′ ∈ (0, t ′ ]. We call relation → D,ϕ the flow transition.
Intuitively, the relation σ → D,ϕ σ ′ means that there is a trajectory from the state represented by σ to that represented by σ ′ such that (1) the trajectory is a solution of D and (2) ϕ holds at any point on the trajectory. 
is the state at t = 1 on the above solution with x 0 = 0 and v 0 = 0. {x → 0, v → 0} → D,x≥0 x → 1 2 , v → 1 also holds because the condition x ≥ 0 continues to hold along with the trajectory from (x, v) = (0, 0) to
x → 1 2 , v → 1 does not hold because the condition x ≥ 1 4 does not hold for the initial 1 √ 2 seconds in this trajectory. Using this relation, we can define a run of an HA as follows.
Remark 3.6. This definition is more complicated than that of runs of DTSTS because we need to treat the last transition from q N −1 , σ N −1 to q N , σ N differently than the other transitions. Each transition from q i , σ i to q i+1 , σ i+1 , if 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 2, is a flow transition followed by a jump transition; however, the last transition consists only of a flow transition.
Example 3.7. Figure 2 shows a hybrid automaton with Q := {q 0 , q 1 } schematically. Each circle represents a location q; we write F (q) for the ODE associated with each circle. Each edge between circles represents a transition; we present the guard of the transition on each edge. We omit the ϕ c part; it is assumed to be the do-nothing command represented by ∧ x∈V x ′ = x.
Both locations are equipped with the same flow that is the anticlockwise circle around the point (x, y) = (0, 0) on the xy plane. The system can stay at q 0 as long as y ≥ 0 and at q 1 as long as y ≤ 0. y = 0 holds whenever a transition is invoked. Indeed, for example, inv (q 0 ) = y ≥ 0 and the guard from q 0 to q 1 is y ≤ 0; therefore, when the transition is invoked, inv (q 0 ) ∧ y ≤ 0 holds, which is equivalent to y = 0.
Starting from the valuation σ 0 := {x → 1, y → 0} at location q 0 , the system reaches σ 1 := {x → −1, y → 0} by the flow F (q 0 ) along which inv (q 0 ) ≡ y ≥ 0 continues to hold; then the transition from q 0 to q 1 is invoked. After that, the system reaches σ 2 := {x → 0, y → −1} by F (q 1 ). Therefore, q 0 , σ 0 q 1 , σ 1 q 1 , σ 2 is a run of this HA.
Safety verification problem
Definition 3.8. We say that σ is reachable in DTSTS S D (resp., HA S H ) if there is a run of S D (resp., S H ) that reaches q, σ for some q. A safety verification problem (SVP) for a DTSTS S D , ϕ (resp., HA S H , ϕ ) is the problem to decide whether σ ′ |= ϕ holds for all the reachable valuation σ ′ of the given S D (resp., S H ).
If an SVP is affirmatively solved, then the system is said to be safe; otherwise, the system is said to be unsafe. One of the major strategies for proving the safety of a system is discovering its inductive invariant.
Unsafety can be proved by discovering a counterexample. 
GPDR is a procedure that tries to find an inductive invariant or a counterexample to a given SVP. SVP is in general undecidable. Therefore, the original GPDR approach [20] and our extension with hybrid systems presented in Section 5 do not terminate for every input.
GPDR for DTSTS
Before presenting our extension of GPDR with hybrid systems, we present the original PDR procedure in this section. We follow the presentation of Generalized PDR (GPDR) by Hoder and Bjørner [20] . Their presentation, compared to the original presentation of PDR by Bradley [8] , is not specialized to a specific description of underlying systems, which makes our adaptation to hybrid systems easier.
Given a safety verification problem S D , ϕ P where S D = Q, q 0 , ϕ 0 , δ , GPDR tries to find (1) an inductive invariant to prove the safety of S D , or (2) a counterexample to refute the safety. To this end, GPDR (nondeterministically) manipulates a data structure called configurations. A configuration is either Valid, Model M , or an expression of the form M || R 0 , . . . , R N ; N . We explain each component of the expression M || R 0 , . . . , R N ; N in the following. (Valid and Model M are explained later.) -R 0 , . . . , R N is a finite sequence of maps from Q to Fml (i.e., elements of Fml). Each R i is called a frame. The frames are updated during an execution of GPDR so that R i (q j ) is an overapproximation of the states that are reachable within i steps from the initial state in S D and whose location is
This sequence is a candidate partial counterexample that starts from the one that is i-step reachable from the initial state and that ends up with a state σ N , q N such that σ N |= ¬ϕ P . Therefore, in order to prove the safety of S D , a GPDR procedure needs to prove that q i , σ i is unreachable within k i steps from an initial state.
In order to formalize the above intuition, GPDR uses a forward predicate transformer determined by S D . In the following, we fix an SVP S D , ϕ P .
where F is called the forward predicate transformer determined by S D , is the following formula:
The latter case is encoded by the second disjunct of the above definition: The valuation σ ′ satisfies the second disjunct if there are q, ϕ, and ϕ c such that (q, ϕ, ϕ c , q ′ ) ∈ δ (i.e., q ′ is 1-step after q in δ) and there is a valuation σ such that σ |= R(q) ∧ ϕ (i.e., σ satisfies the precondition R(q) and the guard ϕ) and σ ′ is a result of executing command c under σ.
The following lemma guarantees that F soundly approximates the transition of an DTSTS.
Proof. Assume σ 1 |= R(q 1 ) and q 1 , σ 1 → δ q 2 , σ 2 . Then, by definition, (q 1 , ϕ, ϕ ′ , q 2 ) ∈ δ and σ 1 |= ϕ and σ 1 ∪ σ ′ 2 |= ϕ c for some ϕ and ϕ c .
By using the forward predicate transformer F , we can formalize the intuition about configuration M || R 0 , . . . , R N ; N explained so far as follows.
Definition 4.3. Let S D be Q, q 0 , ϕ 0 , δ , F be the forward predicate transformer determined by S D , and ϕ P be the safety condition to be verified. A configuration C is said to be consistent if it is (1) of the form Valid, (2) of the form Model σ, q 0 , 0 M , or (3) of the form M || R 0 , . . . , R N ; N that satisfies all of the following conditions: Fig. 3 . The rules for the original PDR. Recall that ¬σ ′ in the rule Conflict denotes
The GPDR procedure rewrites a configuration following the (nondeterministic) rewriting rules in Figure 3 . We add a brief explanation below; for more detailed exposition, see [20] . Although the order of the applications of the rules in Figure 3 is arbitrary, we fix one scenario of the rule applications in the following for explanation.
1. The procedure initializes M to ∅, R 0 to F (λq.false), and N to 0 (Initialize). 2. If there are a valuation σ and a location q such that σ |= R N (q) ∧ ¬ϕ P (Candidate), then the procedure adds σ, q, N to M . The condition σ |= R N (q) ∧ ¬ϕ P guarantees that the state q, σ violates the safety condition ϕ P ; therefore, the candidate σ, q, N needs to be refuted. If not, then the frame sequence is extended by setting N to N + 1 and R N +1 to λq.true (Unfold); this is allowed since ∀q ∈ Q. |= R N (q) =⇒ ϕ P in this case. 3. The discovered q, σ is backpropagated by successive applications of Decide:
In each application of Decide, for q 2 , σ 2 , i + 1 in M , the procedure tries to find σ and q such that
2 is the valuation obtained by replacing the domain of σ 2 with their primed counterpart. These conditions in combination guarantee q 1 , σ 1 → δ q 2 , σ 2 and σ 1 |= R i (q 1 ).
(a) If this backpropagation reaches R 0 (the rule Model), then it reports the trace of the backpropagation returning Model M .
is not satisfiable, then we pick a frame R such that |= R(q ′ ) =⇒ ¬σ ′ and |= F (R i )(q) =⇒ R(q) for any q (the rule Conflict). Intuitively, R is a frame that separates (1) the union of the initial states denoted by ϕ 0 and the states that are one-step reachable from a state denoted by R i (q ′ ) and (2) the state denoted by q ′ , σ ′ . In a GPDR term, R is a generalization of ¬σ ′ . This formula is used to strengthen R j for j ∈ {1, . . . , i + 1}. 4. The frame R obtained in the application of the rule Conflict is propagated forward by applying the rule Induction.
forces that R holds in the one-step transition from a states that satisfies R i . If this condition holds, then R holds for i + 1 steps (Theorem 4.5); therefore, we conjoin R to R 1 (q), . . . , R i+1 (q). In order to maintain the consistency conditions (Con-E) and (Con-F), this rule clears M to the empty set to keep its consistency to the updated frames. Remark 4.4. One of the differences of the above GPDR from the original one [20] is that ours deals with the locations of a given DTSTS explicitly. In the original GPDR, information about locations are assumed to be encoded using a variable that represents the program counter. As far as we know, a formalization of GPDR that treats locations explicitely has not been proposed so far.
Soundness. We fix one DTSTS Q, q 0 , ϕ 0 , δ in this section. The correctness of the GPDR procedure relies on the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.5. Con is invariant to any rule application of Figure 3 .
Theorem 4.6. If the GPDR procedure is started from the rule Initialize and leads to Valid, then the system is safe. If the GPDR procedure is started from the rule Initialize and leads to Model σ 0 , q 0 , 0 . . . σ N , q N , N , then the system is unsafe.
HGPDR
We now present our procedure HGPDR that is an adaptation of the original GPDR to hybrid systems. An adaptation of GPDR to hybrid systems requires the following two challenges to be addressed.
2.
A run of an HA (Definition 3.5) differs from that of DTSTS in that its last transition consists only of flow dynamics; see Remark 3.6.
In order to address the first challenge, we extend the logic on which F is defined to be able to mention flow dynamics and define F on the extended logic (Section 5.1). To address the second challenge, we extend the configuration used by GPDR so that it carries an overapproximation of the states that are reachable from the last frame by a flow transition; the GPDR procedure is also extended to maintain this information correctly (Section 5.2).
Extension of forward predicate transformer
In order to extend F to accommodate flow dynamics, we extend the logic on which F is defined with continuous reachability predicates (CRP) inspired by the differential dynamic logic (dL) proposed by Platzer [32] . 
We call a predicate of the form → D,ϕI ϕ a continuous reachability predicate (CRP).
Using the above predicate, we extend F as follows.
Definition 5.2. For an HA Q, q 0 , ϕ 0 , F, inv , δ , the forward predicate transformer F H (R)(q ′ ) is the following formula:
In the above definition, [x ′′ /x]F (q) is the ODE obtained by renaming the variables x that occur in ODE F (q) with x ′′ . We also define predicate F C (R)(q ′ ) as follows:
Intuitively, σ ′ |= F H (ϕ)(q ′ ) holds if either (1) q ′ , σ ′ is an initial state or (2) it is reachable from R by a flow transition followed a jump transition. Similarly, σ ′ |= F C (R)(q ′ ) holds if σ ′ is reachable in a flow transition (not followed by a jump transition) from a state denoted by ϕ. This definition of F H is an extension of Definition 4.1 in that it encodes the "flow-transition" part of the above intuition by the CRP. In the case of F C , the postcondition part of the CRP is x = x ′′ because we do not need a jump transition in this case.
Initialize ∅ || R0 := FH(λq.false); Rrem := λq.true; N : Fig. 4 . The rules for HGPDR. (6) and (7) imply (8) 
Therefore, from (8) and (9), we have (10) σ ′′ 1 
Lemma 5.4. If σ 1 |= R(q 1 ) and σ 1 → F (q1),inv (q1) σ 2 , then σ 2 |= F C (R)(q 1 ).
Proof. Almost the same argument as the proof of Lemma 5.3.
Extension of GPDR
We present our adaptation of GPDR for hybrid systems, which we call HGPDR. Recall that the original GPDR in Section 4 maintains a configuration of the form M || R 0 , . . . , R N ; N . HGPDR uses a configuration of the form M || R 0 , . . . , R N ; R rem ; N . In addition to the information in the original configurations, we add R rem which we call remainder frame. R rem overapproximates the states that are reachable from R N within one flow transition. Figure 4 presents the rules for HGPDR. The rules from Initialize to Conflict are the same as Figure 3 except that (1) Initialize and Unfold are adapted so that they set the remainder frame to λq.true and (2) Candidate is dropped. We explain the newly added rules.
-PropagateCont discovers a fact that holds in R rem . The side condition |= R N (q) ∨ F C (R N )(q) =⇒ R(q) for any q guarantees that R(q) is true at the remainder frame; hence R is conjoined to R rem . -CandidateCont replaces Candidate in the original procedure. It tries to find a candidate from the frame R rem . The candidate q, σ found here is added to M in the form σ, q, rem to denote that q, σ is found at R rem . -DecideCont propagates a counterexample σ ′ , q ′ , rem found at R rem to the previous frame R N . This rule computes the candidate to be added to M by deciding σ ∪ σ ′ |= R N (q) ∧ F (q) | inv (q) (x = x ′ ), which guarantees that σ evolves to σ ′ under the flow dynamics determined by F (q) and inv (q).
-Conflict uses F H instead of F in the original GPDR. As in the rule
Conflict in GPDR, the frame R in this rule is a generalization of ¬σ ′ which is not backward reachable to R i . -ConflictCont is the counterpart of Conflict for the frame R rem . This rule is the same as Conflict except that it uses F C instead of F H ; hence, R separates σ ′ from both the states denoted by ϕ 0 and the states that are reachable from R i in a flow transition (not followed by a jump transition).
Soundness
In order to prove the soundness of HGPDR, we adapt the definition of Con in Definition 4.3 for HGPDR.
Definition 5.5. Let S H be Q, q 0 , ϕ 0 , F, inv , δ , F H and F C be the forward predicate transformers determined by S H , and ϕ P be the safety condition to be verified. A configuration C is said to be consistent if it is Valid, Model σ, q 0 , 0 M , or Con H (M || R 0 , . . . , R N ; R rem ; N ) that satisfies all of the following:
-(Con-A) R 0 (q 0 ) = ϕ 0 and R 0 (q i ) = false if q i = q 0 ; -(Con-B-1) |= R i (q) =⇒ R i+1 (q) for any q and i < N ; -(Con-B-2) |= R N (q) =⇒ R rem (q) for any q; -(Con-C) |= R i (q) =⇒ ϕ P if i < N ; -(Con-D-1) |= F H (R i )(q) =⇒ R i+1 (q) for any i < N and q; -(Con-D-2) |= F C (R N )(q) =⇒ R rem (q) for any q; -(Con-E) if σ, q, rem ∈ M , then σ |= R rem (q) ∧ ¬ϕ P ; -(Con-F-1) if σ 1 , q 1 , i , σ 2 , q 2 , i + 1 ∈ M and i < N , then q 1 , ϕ, ϕ c , q 2 ∈ δ and σ 1 , σ ′ 2 |= R i (q 1 ) ∧ ϕ ∧ ϕ c ; and -(Con-F-2) if σ 1 , q 1 , N , σ 2 , q 2 , rem ∈ M , then q 1 , ϕ, ϕ c , q 2 ∈ δ and
The soundness proof follows the same strategy as that of the original GPDR.
Lemma 5.6. Con H is invariant to any rule application of Figure 4 .
Theorem 5.7. If HGPDR is started from the rule Initialize and leads to Valid, then the system is safe. If HGPDR is started from the rule Initialize and leads to Model σ 0 , q 0 , 0 . . . σ N , q N , N σ rem , q rem , rem , then the system is unsafe. 
Operational presentation of HGPDR
The definition of HGPDR in Figure 4 is declarative and nondeterministic. For the sake of convenience of implementation, we derive an operational procedure from HGPDR; we call the operational version DetHybridPDR, whose definition is in Algorithm 1.
Discharging verification conditions. An implementation of HGPDR needs to discharge verification conditions during verification. In addition to verification conditions expressed as a satisfiability problem of a first-order predicate, which can be discharged by a standard SMT solver, DetHybridPDR needs to discharge conditions including a CRP predicate. Specifically, DetHybridPDR needs to deal with the following three types of problems.
-Checking whether δ := ψ ∧ D | ϕ I (∧ x∈V x = σ ′ (x)) is satisfiable or not for given first-order predicates ψ and ϕ I , an ODE D, and a valuation σ ′ . DetHybridPDR needs to discharge this type of predicates when it decides which of DecideCont and ConflictCont should be applied if the top of M is σ ′ , q ′ , rem . We use Algorithm 3 for discharging δ. This algorithm Input: Hybrid automaton SH := Q, q0, ϕ0, F, inv , δ ; Trace of counterexamples M; Frames R0, . . . , RN , Rrem ; Natural number N . Output: for q, ϕ, ϕc, q ′ ∈ δ do // i2 is set to ∞ if there is no such i. 5 i2 := the minimum i such that σj |= ϕI for any j < i; 6 if i1 < ∞ then // σi 1 witnesses the satisfiability of δ. 7 return Sat (σi 1 ) 8 else if i2 < ∞ then // σi 2 is the end point of the D −1 with the stay condition ϕI , but σi 2 |= ψ. Therefore, ψ is not backward reachable from σ ′ along with D. Currently, the user needs to provide a predicate that can be used for further refinement. 9 Obtain ψ ′ such that |= ∃x0. 
searches for a valuation σ i that witnesses the satisfiability of δ by using a time-inverted simulation of D as follows. Concretely, this algorithm numerically simulates D −1 , the time-inverted ODE of D, starting from the point {x → σ ′ (x)}. If it reaches a point σ i that satisfies ψ and if all σ i+1 . . . σ ′ in the obtained solution satisfy ϕ I , then σ i witnesses the satisfiability of δ. If such σ i does not exist but there is σ i such that σ i |= ϕ I , then ψ is not backward reachable from σ ′ and hence δ is unsatisfiable. In this case, Algorithm 3 needs to return a predicate that can be used as ψ ′ in the rule ConflictCont in Figure 4 . Currently, we assume that the user provides this predicate. We expect that we can help this step of discovering ψ ′ by using techniques for analyzing continuous dynamics (e.g., automated synthesizer of barrier certificates [33] and Flow* [10] in combination with Craig interpolant synthesis procedures [2, 30] ). If neither holds, then we give up the verification by aborting; this may happen if, for example, the value of T is too small.
or not. DetHybridPDR needs to solve this problem in the choice between Decide and Conflict. This query is different from the previous case in that the formula that appears after
, not x = σ ′ (x); therefore, we cannot use numerical simulation to discharge δ ′ . Although it is possible to adapt Algorithm 3 to maintain the sequence of predicates α 0 α 1 . . . α T −1 instead of valuations so that each α i becomes the preimage of α i−1 by D, the preimage computation at each step is prohibitively expensive.Instead, the current implementation restricts the input system so that there exists at most one σ such that σ |= ϕ ∧ ϕ c ∧ x = σ ′ (x) for any σ ′ ; if this is met, then one can safely use Algorithm 3 for discharging δ ′ . Concretely, we allow only ϕ c that corresponds to the command whose syntax is given by c ::= skip | x := r 1 x + r 2 | x := r 1 x − r 2 where skip is a command that does nothing; r 1 and r 2 are real constants.
-Checking whether ϕ 1 ∧ D | ϕ I ¬ϕ 2 is unsatisfiable. DetHybridPDR needs to discharge this type of queries when it applies Induction or PropagateCont. This case is different from the previous case in that (1) DetHybridPDR may answer Otherwise without aborting the entire verification if unsatisfiability nor satisfiability is proved, and (2) DetHybridPDR does not need to return a generalization if the given predicate is unsatisfiable. We use Algorithm 4 to discharge this type of queries. This algorithm first checks the satisfiability of ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 in Step 1; if it is satisfiable, then so is the entire formula. Then, Step 5 tries to prove that the entire formula is unsatisfiable by proving (1) ϕ 1 is invariant with respect to the dynamics specified by D and ϕ I and (2) ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 is unsatisfiable. In order to prove the former, the algorithm tries the following sufficient condition: For any positive dt that is smaller than a positive real number 6 Step 8 tries the same strategy but tries to prove that ¬ϕ 2 is invariant. If both at-tempts fail, then the algorithm returns Otherwise. 7 This algorithm could be further enhanced by incorporating automated invariant-synthesis procedures [15, 27, 34] .
Proof-of-concept implementation
We implemented DetHybridPDR as a semi-automated verifier. We note that the current implementation is intended to be a proof of concept; extensive experiments are left as future work. The snapshot of the source code as of writing can be found at https://github.com/ksuenaga/HybridPDR/tree/master/src. The verifier takes a hybrid automaton S H specified with SpaceEx modeling language [26] , the initial location q 0 , the initial condition ϕ 0 , and the safety condition ϕ P as input; then, it applies DetHybridPDR to discover an inductive invariant or a counterexample. The frontend of the verifier is implemented with OCaml; in the backend, the verifier uses Z3 [28] and ODEPACK [1] to discharge verification conditions.
As we mentioned in Section 5.4, when a candidate counterexample q ′ , σ ′ , i + 1 turns out to be backward unreachable to R i , then our verifier asks for a generalization of σ ′ to the user; concretely, for example in an application of the rule Conflict, the user is required to give ψ such that |= ψ =⇒ ¬σ ′ and |=
Instead of throwing this query at the user in this form, the verifier asks the following question in order to make this process easier for the user for each (q, ϕ, ϕ c , q ′ ) ∈ δ:
Pre:R i (q); Flow:F (q); Stay:inv (q); Guard:ϕ; Cmd:ϕ c ; CE:σ ′ ; Init:R 0 (q ′ ).
In applying ConflictCont, the verifier omits the fields Guard and Cmd.
We applied the verifier to the hybrid automaton in Figure 2 with several initial conditions and the safety condition ϕ P := x ≤ 1. We remark that the outputs from the verifier presented here are post-processed for readability. We explain how verification is conducted in each setting; we write D for the ODĖ x = −y,ẏ = x.
-Initial condition x = 0 ∧ y = 0 at location q 0 : The verifier finds the inductive invariant {q 0 → x = 0 ∧ y = 0, q 1 → x = 0 ∧ y = 0} after asking for proofs of unsatisfiability to the user 5 times. -Initial condition x ≤ 1 2 at location q 0 : The verifier finds a counterexample {x → 0.490533, y → 1.93995}, from which the system reaches {x → 2.00100, y → 0}. The verifier asks 5 questions, one of which is the following: Notice that the stay condition is y ≥ 0 and the guard is y ≤ 0; therefore the predicate y = 0 holds when a jump transition happens. Since the flow specified by D is an anticlockwise circle whose center is {x → 0, y → 0} with the stay condition y ≥ 0, the states after the flow dynamics followed by a jump transition is x ≤ 0.5 ∧ y = 0, which indeed does not intersect with x = 0.998516 ∧ y = −1.889365. The verification proceeds by giving y ≥ 0 as a generalization in this case.
-Initial condition 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 2 ∧ 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 2 at location q 0 : The verifier finds an inductive invariant
after asking for 8 generalizations to the user. This is indeed an inductive invariant. Noting 0.707107 ≈ 1 √ 2 , we can confirm that (1) the states that are reachable by flow dynamics followed by a jump transition is the set denoted by R(q 0 ); the same holds for the transition from R(q 1 ); (2) it contains the initial condition 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 ∧ 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.5 at location q 0 ; and (3) it does not intersect with the unsafe region x > 1. The following is one of the questions that are asked by the verifier:
Instead of a precise overapproximation ( 
Related work
Compared to its success in software verification [5, 11, 13, 20, 21] , PDR for hybrid systems is less investigated. We have not found a PDR-based model checking for generic hybrid automata. One of the closest to ours seems to be the work by Kindermann et al. [24, 25] . They propose an application of PDR for a timed system-a system that is equipped with clock variables; the flow dynamics of a clock variable c is limited toċ = 1. A clock variable may be also reset to a constant in a jump transition. Kindermann et al. finitely abstract the state space of clock variables by using region abstraction [37] . The abstracted system is then verified using the standard PDR procedure. Later Isenberg et al. [22] propose a method that abstracts clock variables by using zone abstraction [4] . They do not deal with a hybrid system whose flow behavior at each location cannot be described byċ = 1; the system in Figure 2 is out of the scope of their work.
Cimatti et al. [12] propose a method to synthesize system parameters using PDR. Although their presentation of their algorithm is for jump-only transition systems, they apply their method to the benchmarks that come from hybrid system verification. They encode a hybrid automaton by discretizing it with a small finite positive real number; the discretization rate is treated as a parameter so that their algorithm synthesizes it automatically. Their strategy is in contrast to ours that encode the behavior of a system by extending the logic on which a forward predicate transformer is defined.
Our continuous-reachability predicates (CRP) are inspired by Platzer's dL [32] . We may be able to use the theorem prover KeYmaera X for dL predicates [16] for our purpose of discharging CRP.
Conclusion
We proposed an adaptation of GPDR to hybrid systems. For this adaptation, we extended the logic on which the forward predicate transformer is defined with the continuous reachability predicates D | ϕ I ϕ inspired by the differential dynamic logic dL. The extended forward predicate transformer can precisely express the behavior of hybrid systems. We formalized our procedure HGPDR and proved its soundness. We also implemented it as a semi-automated procedure, which proves the safety of a simple hybrid system in Figure 2 .
On top of the current proof-of-concept implementation, we plan to implement a GPDR-based model checker for hybrid systems. We expect that we need to improve the heuristic used in the application of the rule Induction, where we currently check sufficient conditions of the verification condition. We are also looking at automating part of the work currently done by human in verification; this is essential when we apply our method to a system with complex continuoustime dynamics.
A Proof

A.1 Soundness of Vanilla PDR
In the remainder of this section, we fix a DTSTS S D := Q, q 0 , ϕ 0 , δ ; a predicate transformer F determined by S D ; and a safety condition ϕ P to be verified. Proof. Recall the definition of F (R)(q ′ ):
In the above definition, R(q) appears in the position where the strength of F (R)(q ′ ) is monotonic with respect to the strength of R(q). Therefore, changing R to a pointwise-stronger frame R ′ strengthens the entire formula as required.
Proof. From the definition of F .
Proof of Lemma 4.5: Case analysis on the rules in Figure 3 .
Initialize The condition (Con-A) follows from Lemma A.2. The condition (Con-C) follows from the side condition of Initialize. The other conditions hold vacuously. Valid The resulting configuration is consistent as required since it is Valid. Unfold Let C := M || R 0 , . . . , R N ; N , Con(C), and Unfold is applied to this configuration. Let the resulting configuration C ′ := ∅ || A[R N +1 := λq.true; N := N + 1]. From the side condition of Unfold, we have ∀q ∈ Q. |= R N (q) =⇒ ϕ P . We show Con(C ′ ).
, which is true for any q ∈ Q. -(Con-C) holds from the above side condition.
-For (Con-D), it is sufficient to prove |= F (R N )(q) =⇒ R N +1 q for any q, which holds since R N +1 q is equivalent to ∃q ′ ∈ Q.(q = q ′ ). (Con-E) and (Con-F) hold vacuously. Induction Let C := M ||R 0 , . . . , R N ; N , Con(C), and Induction is applied to this configuration. Let A be R 0 , . . . , R N . Then, the resulting configuration
-(Con-A) holds since R 0 is unchanged.
-To prove (Con-B), fix q ′′ ∈ Q and i ′ ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} arbitrarily. We prove |= R i ′ q ′′ =⇒ R i ′ +1 q ′′ . If i ′ > 0, then (Con-B) immediately follows from (Con-B) for C. Only interesting case is i ′ = 0, in which we must show |= R 0 q ′′ =⇒ λq.R 1 (q) ∧ R(q) q ′′ . Since |= R 0 q ′′ =⇒ R 1 q ′′ follows from the condition (Con-B) for C, we show |= R 0 q ′′ =⇒ R(q ′′ ), which follows from Lemma A.4 and (Con-A) for C. -(Con-C) is trivial since Induction strengthen each R i q .
-To prove (Con-D), fix j < N and q ∈ Q arbitrarily; we show |= F (R ′ j )(q) =⇒ R ′ j+1 q for R ′ j and R ′ j+1 in C ′ , where R ′ k is defined as follows:
• If j > i + 1, then (Con-D) for C ′ follows from (Con-D) for C.
• If j = i + 1, then we are to prove |= F (λq.R i+1 (q) ∧ R(q))(q) =⇒ R i+2 q . This follows from (Con-D) for C and Lemma A.3. • If 1 ≤ j < i + 1, then we are to prove |= F (λq.R j (q) ∧ R(q))(q) =⇒ λq.R j+1 (q) ∧ R(q) q , which is equivalent to (1) |= (q = q 0 ∧ϕ 0 ) =⇒ R j+1 (q)∧R(q) and (2) Suppose that an execution of GPDR starts from Initialize and ends at Valid. By Lemma 4.5 and mathematical induction on the length of the execution, the configuration C just before it reaches Valid is consistent. Let C be M || A; then, from the side condition of Valid, there exists i < N such that ∀q ∈ Q. |= R i (q) =⇒ R i−1 (q). For such R i−1 , we have the following three facts:
-|= R 0 (q) =⇒ R i−1 (q) for any q ∈ Q from (Con-A) and (Con-B); -|= F (R i−1 )(q) =⇒ R i−1 (q) for any q from (Con-B) and (Con-D); -|= R i−1 (q) =⇒ ϕ P for any q ∈ Q from (Con-C).
Therefore, R i−1 is a fixed point that proves unreachability of ¬ϕ P from R 0 via F . This leads to the safety of the system since Lemma 4.2 asserts that F soundly approximates the dynamics of the DTSTS S D .
On the contrary, suppose an execution of GPDR leads to Model σ 0 , q 0 , 0 . . . σ N , q N , N from Initialize. Let the configuration one step before the final one be C. By the same discussion as the previous case, C is consistent. We have the following facts about σ 0 , q 0 , 0 . . . σ N , q N , N :
σ 0 |= ϕ 0 by (Con-A) and (Con-F); -From (Con-F), for each σ (1) , q (1) , i and σ (2) , q (2) , i + 1 , there is a transition from the former to the latter; and σ N |= ¬ϕ P by (Con-E).
Therefore, q 0 , σ 0 → δ . . . → δ q N , σ N is a valid trace of S D , which witnesses that S D is unsafe.
A.2 Soundness of HGPDR
In the remainder of this section, set S H to Q, q 0 , ϕ 0 , F, inv , δ , F H and F C to the forward predicate transformers determined by S H , and ϕ P to a safety condition to be verified.
Lemma A.5. Let R 0 := F H (λq.false). Then, R 0 (q 0 ) = ϕ 0 and R 0 (q i ) = false if q i = q 0 .
Proof. By the definition of F H . The proof is the same argument as that of Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.6. |= F H (R ′ )(q) =⇒ F H (R)(q) for any R and q if |= R ′ (q) =⇒ R(q) for any q.
Proof. By the definition of F H . The proof is the same argument as that of Lemma A.3.
Lemma A.7. If |= F H (R ′ )(q) =⇒ R(q), then |= q = q 0 ∧ ϕ 0 =⇒ R(q).
Proof. From the definition of F H .
Proof of Lemma 5.6: Case analysis on the rules in Figure 4 . We omit the cases whose proof is almost the same as that of Lemma 4.5.
Unfold Let C := M || R 0 , . . . , R N , R rem ; N , Con H (C), and Unfold is applied to this configuration. Let the resulting configuration C ′ := ∅ || A[R N +1 := λq.true, R rem := λq.true; N := N + 1]. From the side condition of Unfold, we have ∀q ∈ Q. |= R rem (q) =⇒ ϕ P . We show Con H (C ′ ).
-For (Con-B) , it is sufficient to show |= R N q =⇒ R N +1 q for any q ∈ Q. By definition, R N +1 q is equivalent to ∃q ′ ∈ Q.(q = q ′ ), which is true for any q ∈ Q. -(Con-C) holds from the above side condition and (Con-B-1) and (Con-B-2). -For (Con-D-1) and (Con-D-2) are similar to the proof of Lemma 4.5.
(Con-E), (Con-F-1), and (Con-F-2) hold vacuously.
Conflict Same as the proof of Lemma 4.5 wherein we use Lemma A.6 instead of Lemma A.3. Induction Let C := M || R 0 , . . . , R N , R rem ; N , Con H (C), and Induction is applied to this configuration. Let A be R 0 , . . . , R N , R rem . Then, the resulting configuration C ′ is M || A[R j := λq.R j (q) ∧ R(q)] i+1 j=1 ; N , where |= F H (λq.R i (q) ∧ R(q))(q) =⇒ R(q) for any q ∈ Q. We show Con H (C ′ ).
-To prove (Con-B-1), fix q ′′ ∈ Q and i ′ ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} arbitrarily. We prove |= R i ′ q ′′ =⇒ R i ′ +1 q ′′ . If i ′ > 0, then (Con-B) immediately follows from (Con-B) for C. Only interesting case is i ′ = 0, in which we must show |= R 0 q ′′ =⇒ λq.R 1 (q) ∧ R(q) q ′′ . Since |= R 0 q ′′ =⇒ R 1 q ′′ follows from the condition (Con-B) for C, we show |= R 0 q ′′ =⇒ R(q ′′ ), which follows from Lemma A.7 and (Con-A) for C. -(Con-B-2) trivially holds since Induction does not change R rem . -(Con-C) is trivial since Induction strengthen each R i q .
-To prove (Con-D-1), fix j < N and q ∈ Q arbitrarily; we show |= F H (R ′ j )(q) =⇒ R ′ j+1 q for R ′ j and R ′ j+1 in C ′ , where R ′ k is defined as follows:
